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The application of the rule is often difficult. Of course, where the
homicide is committed solely in defense of personal property it Is
absolutely unjustifiable, and the state can apply the rule without
being forced to weaken the case for the prosecution by giving instruc-
tions on self-defense. In such cases the application of the rule is
simple, and speedy justice prevails. For example: In Grigsby V.
Commonwealth, supra., defendant killed a man to prevent him from
taking his whiskey. Defendant asked for instructions on self-defense.
The court held that as there was no evidence that he was in danger
of death or great bodily harm he was not entitled to such Instructions.
However, in cases where the defense of personal property Is connected
with other facts, such as a forcible resistance by the wrongdoer of the
owner's attempt to protect his property, the case confronting the state
is not so simple. This is very well illustrated In Commonwealth v.
Beverly, supra. In that case the defendant stated that the reason he
fired after being requested to desist was because of the fact that from
the circumstances of the case and that thieves usually go armed he
felt in danger and expected a shot. The court Instructed that if the
defendant had reasonable grounds to believe and in good faith did
believe that it was necessary to kill in order to save himself from
death or great bodily harm his act was justifiable on the grounds of
self-defense or apparent necessity. Under the same or similar cir-
cumstances a jury might find that apparent necessity to kill existed,
when, in fact, the defendant knew his life was not in danger. For the
above reasons it is readily seen that homicide in self-defense, while
having no connection whatever with homicide in defense of personal
property, often provides loopholes for one to kill solely in defense of
personal property and escape punishment on the grounds of necessary
or apparently, necessary self-defense. WIrEmiA HUME
CRIES-ENTRAPpENT.-The county sheriff had reasonable grounds
to believe that the appellant was engaged in the illicit traffic In intoxi-
cating liquors. The sheriff employed X, an experienced undercover
man In the federal prohibition service, to Investigate the matter. X
presented himself to the appellant as a bootlegger and made an agree-
ment to purchase liquor at a stipulated price to be delivered at a
designated place. The appellant was arrested by X in the process of
delivering the liquor. It was held that the plea of entrapment was
not a good defense in this case. State v. Ragan, 288 Pac. 218 (1930).
In the principal case the investigating party had reasonable grounds
for suspecting the accused, the accused had In fact made many previous
sales, and X did nothing towards manufacturing the crime. It is
practically the universal rule that under such circumstances there Is
no entrapment. The principal case represents an almost iron-clad case
under the general and federal rules on entrapment-"Where a criminal
is dectected by means of a trap set for him, entrapment is no defense
unless It appears that he was actually persuaded and induced to
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commit the crime by the entrapping parties and not merely furnished
an opportunity by them." De Mayo v. United States, 32 F. (2d) 472
,(1929); C. C. A. (8th); Butts v. United States C. C. A. (8th), 273 F. 35;
Cooke v. Com., 199 Ky. 111, 250 S. W. 802 (1923); State v. Lambert, 148
Wash. 657, 269 P. 848 (1928). The few dissents are based on a dis-
agreement about the whole policy of allowing the officials any right
to trap criminals or use "decoys." Smith v. State, 61 Tex. Cr. 328, 135
S. W. 154; Brandeis dissent in Casey v. United States, 48 Sup. Ct.
373 (1928).
Many cases on the point in question state that the evidence for
the State must show both that the design originated in the minds of
the accused and that -the agents had reasonable grounds for suspect-
ing the accused. United States v. Certain Quantities of Intoxicating
Liquors, 290 F. 824 (1923); Butts v. United States (C. C. A. 8th), 273
F. 35. Although many cases, especially the earlier ones, stress the
"reasonable grounds" theory (St. Clair v. United States (1927; C. C.
A. 8th), 17 F. (2d) 886, an investigation of a large number of cases
will discolse the fallacy of the contention that the defense of entrap-
ment will always lie unless reasonable grounds for suspicion are
shown. Claxton v. People, 82 Colo. 115, 257 Pac. 347 (1927); Bauer
v. Cor., 135 Va. 463, 115 S. E. 514 (1923); State v. Seidler, - Mo. App.
-, 267 S. W 424 (1924); United States v. Wray (1925; D. C.) 8 F.
(2d) 429. Where the reasonable grounds are present the courts will
still stress such point, but where evidence of reasonable suspicions is
lacking many courts hold that either such a point is not a matter for
consideration, [United States v. Washington, 20 F. (2d) 160] or that
the sale is an inference that reasonable grounds were present
[2'apolitano v. United States, 3 F. (2d) 994] or that reasonable
grounds that "someone" was violating the law is sufficient. United
States v. Wray, 8 F. (2d) 429 (1925).
The present cases in practical application if not in theory use
reasonable grounds primarily as the test in consideration of the
questions as to the degree of persuasion that will be permitted-the
greater the reasonable grounds for suspicion the greater the latitude
in the means and manner of investigation. Sills v. United States
(1927; C. C. A. 8th), 16 F. (2d) 568.
The most difficult point in entrapment cases is the test to apply
in consideration as to whether the design originated in the mind of
the accused or of the government agent. The majority of cases hold
that if the accused can show an absence of previous sales, the presump-
tion is that the design originated with the officers. Butts v. United
States (C. C. A. 8th), 273 F. 35. Several recent cases show a dissent
from such view. United States v. Washington (1927; D. C.), 20 F.
(2d) 160. The present tendency is to look at the conduct of the
officers as the criterion to determine where the design originated.
The courts look at all the circumstances of the case, the presence or
absence of reasonable grounds, and then make a decision as to whether
the governmental agents used undue persuasion or trickery; if the
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answer is in the affirmative, the conclusion is that the design originated
with them; if the answer is in the negative, the conclusion is that the
design originated with the accused. Some courts declare that it must
appear clearly that the officers have "bent the will" of the accused if
entrapment is to be a good defense. United States v. Washington
(1927; D. C.), 20 F. (2d) 160.
Only one case has been reported in Kentucky on this phase of
the entrapment question. Cooke v. Com., 199 Ky. 111, 250 S. W. 802
(1923). This case presents no difficulty in that it lines up four square
with the principal case and thus clearly follows the general rule.
The entrapment question in connection with liquor and narcotics
Is handled similarly to entrapment in connection with bribery cases.
abortion cases, the sending of obscene mail cases, etc. However, the
tendency is to allow greater freedom to the officers in connection with
liquor and narcotic eases. Several recent cases have held no entrap-
ment where the officers with no information about the accused, without
any reasonable grounds for suspicion, and with quite a degree of
deception have trapped the accused. United States v. Washington
(1927; D. C.), 20 F. (2d) 160; State v. Seicdler, Mo. App. -, 267 S. W.
424.
Although it appears that the plea that public policy demands that
public officers set no traps is faulty and that a better view is expressed
in the general rule as set forth in the principal case in that no one
would reasonably yield to an ordinary trap unless the intention of
violating the law was present, and while it appears that an objective
test is the best means to determine what was such pre-existing Intent,
it does not follow that the slight present tendency to allow liquor and
narcotic officers unusual means of enforcement is grounded in sound
public policy. It appears to be a better view to hold liquor and narcotic
agents to the same recognized rules followed in the investigation and
enforcement of other offenses. The law enforcement will not be
hampered by such procedure to an extent that it is warrantable to
declare that the end justifies questionable means.
RAWLINGs RAGLAND
ENTRAPMENT iN NARcoTIc LAW VIoLATioNs.-The plea of entrap-
ment as a bar to criminal prosecution has been made with ever-increas-
ing frequency in recent years. Especially is this true as regards
federal and state prosecutions under the illicit liquor laws and In
prosecutions for violations of the Harrison Narcotic Act, and state
laws of similar nature. These types of cases are the most usual ones,
and the attention of this article will be confined to the latter. Although
such limitation of the discussion seems illogical, it is planned to do
so because of the somewhat apparent difference between the rule in
these cases and in other types such as liquor law violations. SwaIlum
v. U. S., 39 Fed., 2d, 230 (Feb., 1930).
When the plea of entrapment is made it becomes the duty of the
court to apply the law as laid down by precedent to the facts and
